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We use Japanese ﬁrm-level data to examine how a ﬁrm’s productivity aﬀects
its choice of foreign-market entry strategy. We study a sequence of decisions,
starting with the choice between exporting and foreign direct investment
(FDI). In the case of FDI, the ﬁrm faces two options: greenﬁeld investment
or merger and acquisition (M&A). If it selects greenﬁeld investment, it has
two ownership choices: whole ownership or a joint venture. Controlling for
industry- and country-speciﬁc characteristics, we ﬁnd that the more pro-
ductive a ﬁrm is, the more likely it is to choose FDI rather than exporting,
greenﬁeld investment rather than M&A, and whole ownership rather than a
joint venture. We also ﬁnd that the assumed sequence of decisions ﬁts the
data better than alternative speciﬁcations.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: F12, F15.
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, merger and acquisition, joint
venture, greenﬁeld investment, ﬁrm heterogeneity, productivity1 Introduction
In this paper we use data on Japanese manufacturers for the period 1985 to
2000 to examine which strategies a ﬁrm will use to enter a foreign market.
Will it export goods produced at home or will it produce goods in the for-
eign country? If it chooses to produce abroad, will it set up a new production
facility or will it acquire an existing ﬁrm? If it establishes a new facility, how
will it own it: will it choose whole ownership or create a joint venture where
it shares ownership with a local ﬁrm? Our objective is to study (i) whether
there exist systematic links between these strategic choices and observable
ﬁrm characteristics, such as productivity, and (ii) whether these choices are
interdependent. Our data set is uniquely suited for this task, since it allows
us to distinguish between diﬀerent foreign direct investment (FDI) and own-
ership modes, and also has enough detail on parent companies to enable us
to study the impact of ﬁrm-speciﬁc determinants.
It is a commonplace nowadays that foreign direct investment (FDI) has
replaced international trade as the main driving force behind the global inte-
gration of product markets. According to UNCTAD (2004), aggregate sales
by foreign aﬃliates have exceeded world exports for more than two decades.
The literature on this phenomenon has traditionally focused on country- and
industry-level determinants of trade and FDI, such as factor endowments,
market size and economies of scale (see Markusen, 2002, for a recent survey),
while treating ﬁrms within an industry as homogeneous. However, empirical
evidence shows that there also exists signiﬁcant heterogeneity within indus-
tries regarding ﬁrms’ participation in exporting and FDI. Recent studies
therefore examine which ﬁrm characteristics drive FDI and exporting deci-
sions. They indicate that only ﬁrms whose productivity exceeds a certain
threshold level tend to become exporters and only the most productive ﬁrms
within an industry engage in FDI.1 Firm characteristics thus appear to play
a signiﬁcant role in exporting and foreign investment in addition to country-
1See, e.g., Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004) for papers on ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Girma et al. (2005) examine the eﬀect of productiviy on the FDI-versus- exporting decision
of UK ﬁrms, Head and Ries (2003) do this for Japanese ﬁrms. A a recent survey of the
literature is provided by Greenaway and Kneller (2005).
1and industry-speciﬁc factors.
The novelty of our paper is to examine in much more detail than has been
done previously the diﬀerent decisions involved in undertaking FDI, and in
which of these decisions ﬁrm characteristics come into play. For instance,
does productivity aﬀect the choice between greenﬁeld FDI and merger and
acquisition (M&A)? Does it inﬂuence the choice between one of these FDI
modes and exporting? Does productivity also determine the choice of own-
ership structure of an aﬃliate?
Our paper is motivated by two empirical observations. First, there is con-
siderable variation in the way ﬁrms enter foreign markets that goes beyond
the simple binary choice between FDI and exporting. Classifying FDI strate-
gies by investment mode (greenﬁeld investment versus M&A) and ownership
mode (whole ownership of the subsidiary versus a joint venture), we ﬁnd
evidence that both investment modes as well as both ownership modes are
empirically important. For example, in our data on Japanese manufactur-
ers, greenﬁeld investment into wholly owned subsidiaries accounts for 44.1%
of investment projects, greenﬁeld investment into joint ventures for 38.6%,
and M&As for 17.3%.2 These market-entry options are seen by the ﬁrms
themselves and by the public as quite distinct strategies with very diﬀerent
implications, for instance, for market structure and competition (see UNC-
TAD, 2000, p. 161).
Second, a look at the raw data suggests that the choice of market-entry
strategy may be correlated with ﬁrm productivity, size and other ﬁrm char-
acteristics. In particular, we observe that the choice of market-entry strategy
varies both across and within industries with respect to ﬁrms’ total factor
productivity (TFP) and total assets. An ANOVA test of diﬀerences in the
mean TFP or mean size (measured by total assets) of the ﬁrms choosing dif-
ferent entry strategies reveals that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences. The ﬁrms
2M&As are much more important if one looks not at a count of investment projects
but at their value. In this, Japanese FDI follows a worldwide trend. Global cross-border
M&As in value terms have replaced greenﬁeld investment as the main mode of FDI over
the past decade. In 1999, for instance, the value of cross-border M&As amounted to 80%
of total world FDI ﬂows (UNCTAD, 2000, p. xx). World cross-border M&A sales peaked
at $1.14 trillion in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 411).
2choosing greenﬁeld investment, either in a wholly owned subsidiary or a joint
venture, are on average more productive and also bigger than ﬁrms choos-
ing M&A, whereas the latter are on average more productive than exporters
(more on this in the section on descriptive statistics and in Table 3).
It would be premature, of course, to conclude from these simple correla-
tions that there is indeed a systematic and statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence
of ﬁrm productivity or size on the market entry mode. To see if such an
inﬂuence truly exists, we have to carry out a proper regression analysis that
addresses the following two issues. First, we have to control for other po-
tential determinants of the market-entry mode, speciﬁcally industry- and
country-level inﬂuences, as well as for the possibility that productivity may
interact with these other determinants. Second, we have to account for the
fact that the diﬀerent market-entry choices may be interdependent. For in-
stance, whether a ﬁrm will choose FDI over exporting may depend on how
proﬁtable it expects greenﬁeld investment or M&A to be. Whether a ﬁrm
would choose M&A and how much it would oﬀer to pay a potential target
ﬁrm should depend on how much it would expect to earn if it instead invested
in a wholly owned greenﬁeld project or formed a joint venture with a local
ﬁrm. This suggests that one cannot just compare the diﬀerent choices as if
they were made simultaneously. Rather, one should investigate empirically
whether these decisions are interdependent and, if they are, what the relevant
structure of the ﬁrm’s decision tree is.
To provide some guidance for our empirical investigation, we develop a
simple model, in which the possible sequential nature of the decision process
is made explicit and in which we examine the inﬂuence of productivity as
well as industry- and country-speciﬁc factors on the market-entry decision.
Speciﬁcally, we show that the trade-oﬀs between diﬀerent strategy options
vary with the ﬁrm’s productivity. This allows us to generate testable pre-
dictions regarding the ﬁrm’s market-entry decision that we then take to the
data.
Our paper is linked to several strands of literature. First, it ties into the
recent literature on ﬁrm heterogeneity in international trade and FDI (see
Footnote 1). This literature suggests that ﬁrm productivity complements the
3more traditional country- and industry-level determinants of trade and FDI,
such as factor endowments, market size and economies of scale. The speciﬁc
contribution of our paper is to take into account that there is not just one way
to do FDI. We show that productivity is also crucial for the choice between
greenﬁeld FDI and M&A, and between whole ownership and joint venture.
Second, we provide empirical evidence that a more comprehensive treat-
ment of ﬁrms’ market-entry options matters. For instance, we ﬁnd that the
choice between greenﬁeld FDI and M&A indeed depends on the proﬁtability
of the ownership modes (whole ownership versus joint venture), and that a
sequential model of market-entry decisions provides a better ﬁt with the data
than alternative speciﬁcations. Previous papers have typically concentrated
on the choice between just two of the market-entry options (FDI versus ex-
porting, greenﬁeld FDI versus M&A, joint venture versus whole ownership).
Theoretical models of horizontal cross-border mergers are provided by Bjor-
vatn (2004), Horn and Persson (2001) and Neary (2003), among others. Nocke
and Yeaple (2004) build a theoretical model of international mergers, in which
ﬁrms trade assets in an international merger market. G¨ org et al. (2007) ex-
amine empirically the rise in cross-border M&As, whereas Iranzo (2004) and
Tekin-Koru (2004) provide empirical studies of the choice between green-
ﬁeld investment and M&A. Another empirical paper, Bertrand et al. (2003),
studies the location of cross-border M&As. The literature on international
joint ventures has tended to focus on identifying factors determining their
success or failure (see Caves, 1996). Interesting exceptions are Asiedu and
Esfahani (2001) and Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) who investigate the own-
ership choices of multinational ﬁrms; these two papers also provide a detailed
survey of the joint venture literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
theoretical framework. Section 3 presents the descriptive statistics, Section
4 contains the empirical analysis, and Section 5 concludes. Proofs and a
detailed description of the data are provided in the Appendix.
42 Theoretical Framework
In this section we develop a simple model of horizontal FDI by considering
a ﬁrm that wants to sell in a foreign market the same good that it produces
at home. This allows us to be clear about the interaction of ﬁrm-, industry-
and country-speciﬁc determinants of the ﬁrm’s strategy without having to
consider the additional issue of horizontal versus vertical motives for this
choice.3 We build our model around two key ingredients, namely imperfect
competition and an explicit role for productive assets. Imperfect competi-
tion arises because the ﬁrm faces Cournot competition from local ﬁrms in
the foreign market. In this respect the model draws on the industrial orga-
nization literature on horizontal mergers and joint ventures, including the
work of Perry and Porter (1985), Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983), and
Yi (1998). We also assume that ﬁrms own productive assets, e.g., technol-
ogy, management skills, specialized intermediate inputs, that determine their
productivity (see, for instance, Farrell and Shapiro, 1990). If a ﬁrm chooses
exporting or establishes a wholly-owned subsidiary, it has to rely on its own
productive assets. M&A implies that the ﬁrm acquires the assets of a lo-
cal target ﬁrm and combines them with its own assets. If two ﬁrms form a
joint venture, they, too, share their assets, but remain independent in other
decisions, speciﬁcally their choice of output.4
We denote the home country by h and the host country by f, and assume
that markets in the two countries are segmented. The relevant market for our
analysis is the one in f, where quasi-linear preferences give rise to a linear
inverse demand function p = a − bQ, with p denoting the equilibrium price
for an aggregate supply of Q. When the home ﬁrm enters f it faces Cournot
3This focus is also justiﬁed by the stylized facts, especially since we want to give the
ﬁrm the option to choose M&A: The World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2000, p. 101)
ﬁnds that around 70% of cross-border M&As are of the horizontal and less than 10% of
the vertical type, the remainder being classiﬁed as conglomerate.
4This setup is consistent with the stylized facts. For instance, among the main motives
for the choice of cross-border M&As, according to UNCTAD (2000, p. 143), are gaining
market power, taking advantage of scale economies and acquiring assets. The report (ibid,
p. 127) also ﬁnds that industries characterized by signiﬁcant M&A activity have typically
experienced rising concentration ratios.
5competition from a ﬁxed number n − 1 of incumbents. We label the home
ﬁrm as ﬁrm 1 and the local ﬁrms as ﬁrms 2,...,n. Hence Q =
Pn
i=1 qi, where
qi is the output of an individual ﬁrm. The marginal cost of production of ﬁrm
i when it produces in country j = h,f is given by cij ≡ wj − αi, where wj
denotes the country-j wage and αi represents the ﬁrm’s productive assets.
Hence, the more assets a ﬁrm has the more productive it is. If the home ﬁrm
serves f through exports from its home-country plant, an additional unit
trade cost of size t arises. We assume that t < (a−n(wh −α1)+
Pn
i=2(wf −
αi))/n so that the proﬁt from exporting is positive. Building a plant in the
foreign country in the case of greenﬁeld investment involves a sunk cost F.
If the home ﬁrm wants to acquire a local ﬁrm (and its production plant),
it makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer that the latter accepts or rejects. After
the merger, the two ﬁrms combine their assets and the home ﬁrm decides
how much output to produce in the acquired plant. We assume that ﬁrm
2 is the most suitable acquisition target, and refer to the merged ﬁrm as
ﬁrm 1.5 Furthermore, we assume that the home ﬁrm is able to manage a
merger, because its assets are not smaller than any local ﬁrm’s assets, that
is, α1 ≥ α2. How well the assets of the two ﬁrms complement each other is
measured by a parameter γ ≤ 1. In particular, we let the marginal cost of
the merged ﬁrm be given by wf − γ(α1 + α2). If γ = 1, the assets of the two
ﬁrms complement each other perfectly; if γ < 1, some of the assets overlap
or are otherwise diﬃcult to combine.6
Once the home ﬁrm has paid the sunk cost of F to establish a greenﬁeld
presence, it may operate a wholly owned subsidiary or oﬀer to enter into
5Modelling the selection of an acquisition target is beyond the scope of the current pa-
per, simply because we do not have any data on the characteristics of actual and potential
target ﬁrms. Still, it would be a worthwhile to investigate this issue in the future if only
in a theory paper. For example, if one assumed that the selection process took the form of
an auction with foreign ﬁrms announcing at which price they would be willing to be taken
over, then one could show that the home ﬁrm would pick the most productive foreign ﬁrm
as its target.
6Note that we could also accomodate the case where γ > 1. Another reasonable exten-
sion would be to assume that after the merger ﬁrm 1 is less eﬃcient at using the assets of
ﬁrm 2 than that ﬁrm on its own. In this case we would have c1f ≡ wf − γ(α1 + βα2) for
β < 1.
6a joint venture with a local partner.7 There are many reasons why ﬁrms
may enter into a joint venture. A key beneﬁt is that a joint venture allows
the two ﬁrms to share assets, for instance, by exchanging technology and
marketing know-how, sharing R&D or specialized inputs, while remaining
independent in other respects (see Yi, 1998). We assume speciﬁcally that
the joint venture partners continue to choose output independently. A key
problem arising in joint ventures is how the partners are compensated for
the assets they contribute, especially if it is diﬃcult to determine ex ante
the value of speciﬁc assets, such as technology, R&D or specialized inputs,
that the partners will share. The value of the assets contributed by each
partner may also be unveriﬁable to outside parties ex post and hence non-
contractible. We capture this in a simple way, namely by assuming that there
are no (side-) payments between the joint venture partners ex ante and that
partners cannot be prevented from using each other’s assets ex post.
Which foreign ﬁrm would the home ﬁrm pick as its partner? Given that
the home ﬁrm wanted to acquire the assets of ﬁrm 2 in the case of a merger,
it seems reasonable to assume that it would also beneﬁt most from sharing its
assets with this ﬁrm in case of a joint venture; and it would not be subgame
perfect for the home ﬁrm to deny the joint venture to ﬁrm 2, only because
the latter turned down its merger oﬀer. Hence, let ﬁrm 2 be the potential
joint venture partner.8 The marginal cost of partner ﬁrm i = 1,2 in a joint
venture then is wf − γ(α1 + α2).
We represent the overall decision-making process by the following sequen-
tial game: in stage one, ﬁrm 1 chooses between exporting and making a take-
it-or-leave-it oﬀer to acquire ﬁrm 2. In stage two, ﬁrm 2 decides whether
to accept or reject the oﬀer. If it rejects the oﬀer, we come to stage 3, in
which ﬁrm 1 chooses whether to invest greenﬁeld. In stage 4, if it has se-
lected greenﬁeld investment, the ﬁrm may choose between whole ownership
7The assumption that F is paid by the home ﬁrm is made for simplicity; not much
would change, if we assumed that this cost was shared by the joint venture partners.
8If the home ﬁrm picked a joint venture partner other than ﬁrm 2, we would have to
modify the merger oﬀer that the home ﬁrm makes to ﬁrm 2. In particular, the home ﬁrm
could potentially reduce its merger oﬀer, which would make M&A a more attractive option
relative to greenﬁeld FDI. However, the main results of the model would still hold.
7and making a joint-venture proposal to ﬁrm 2. In stage 5, ﬁrm 2 has the
option of accepting or rejecting this proposal. In stage 6, all ﬁrms choose
output noncooperatively. Note that in this setup, ﬁrm 1 can always make an
unacceptably low merger oﬀer to ﬁrm 2, if it prefers greenﬁeld investment or
a joint venture. Hence moving the M&A decision to stage 2 does not reduce
ﬁrm 1’s choices, but allows us to make explicit that greenﬁeld investment,
either through a wholly owned subsidiary or in the form of a joint venture, is
ﬁrm 1’s outside option if ﬁrm 2 refuses the acquisition oﬀer. Also note that
we will examine below whether this sequence of moves is in fact consistent
with our data.
Solving the game backwards, we begin with the choice of ownership mode
(whole ownership versus joint venture) in the case of greenﬁeld investment.
We obtain the following result:
Result 1 The home ﬁrm is more likely to prefer whole ownership to a joint
venture with a foreign ﬁrm the more productive it is and the more concen-
trated is the foreign industry.
Proof: see Appendix A.1.
The reason for this is the following: a joint venture allows both partners
to reduce their costs and take market share away from the other ﬁrms; at the
same time, the joint venture partner with fewer assets (namely the foreign
ﬁrm) experiences a larger drop in its marginal cost and hence gains market
share relative to the partner with more assets (the home ﬁrm). Hence if the
home ﬁrm has a lot more assets than its foreign partner, a joint venture
would mean that it would lose more market share to its partner than it can
gain from the n − 2 other ﬁrms, making the joint venture an unattractive
option. This problem is even more severe if n is small.
Next, consider the home ﬁrm’s choice between M&A and greenﬁeld in-
vestment. If a joint venture is the preferred ownership mode for greenﬁeld
FDI, then we have to compare the home ﬁrm’s proﬁt from M&A with its
proﬁt in case of a joint venture. We can show:
8Result 2 If the home ﬁrm prefers a joint venture to a wholly owned sub-
sidiary, it is more likely to prefer greenﬁeld FDI to a merger the more pro-
ductive it is, the smaller is the sunk cost of investment, the bigger is the
foreign market, and the lower is the foreign wage rate.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
This result is due to the so-called merger paradox: the price increase asso-
ciated with the merger gives the independent ﬁrms an incentive to raise their
output. The merged ﬁrm responds by cutting its own output, thus losing
market share to the independent rivals and making the merger unproﬁtable
in the absence of cost savings. By contrast, the joint venture partners face
no such problem, as they continue to choose output independently. On the
contrary, the cost advantage oﬀered by sharing assets in a joint venture leads
to a larger market share and higher proﬁts for the joint venture. This ad-
vantage of the joint venture becomes more pronounced, ceteris paribus, the
more assets the home ﬁrm has, the smaller is the sunk cost of investment,
the larger is the foreign market and the lower is the foreign wage.9
Now suppose that the home ﬁrm’s preferred ownership mode in the case
of greenﬁeld FDI is whole ownership. We then have to compare the potential
M&A proﬁt to the proﬁt of running a wholly owned subsidiary. We ﬁnd:
Result 3 If the home ﬁrm prefers a wholly owned subsidiary to a joint ven-
ture, it is more likely to prefer greenﬁeld FDI to a merger the more productive
it is, the smaller is the sunk cost of investment, the bigger is the foreign mar-
ket, and the lower is the foreign wage rate.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
The intuition for this result is similar to that for the previous result.
Namely, the merger paradox is more harmful to a productive ﬁrm operating
in a large market where labor costs are low. Obviously, a small sunk cost
favors greenﬁeld FDI.
9Note that the eﬀect of market structure is ambiguous because an increase in the
number of foreign rivals reduces not only the operating proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm and the
joint venture, but also the acquisition price in the case of the merger. A similar ambiguity
also occurs in subsequent comparisons of entry modes.
9The connection between productivity and choice of investment and own-
ership modes is illustrated in Figure 1. The last stage of the decision process
concerns the choice of ownership mode: whole ownership or joint venture.
According to Result 1, whole ownership is the preferred option in regions M2
and W, whereas a joint venture is chosen in regions M1 and JV. The predic-
tion is that the home ﬁrm will choose whole ownership if it owns suﬃciently
many productive assets. The dividing line between the two areas depends on
the number of foreign ﬁrms. The more concentrated is the industry, the more
likely whole ownership becomes.
Next, consider the choice between greenﬁeld FDI and M&A, taking into
account the home ﬁrm’s anticipated choice of ownership mode. If the home
ﬁrm anticipates that greenﬁeld FDI will take the form of a joint venture,
then Result 2 tells us that M&A is chosen in region M1 and greenﬁeld FDI
in region JV. We show in Appendix A.2 that the dividing line between the
two region is a straight line with a slope of (−1). If the home ﬁrm’s preferred
ownership mode is whole ownership, then the region labelled M2 represents
the parameter values for which ﬁrm 1 will choose M&A (see Result 3); in
region W, it will opt for greenﬁeld investment. The clear prediction is that
given the home ﬁrm’s anticipated choice of ownership mode, the more pro-
ductive assets the home ﬁrm owns, the more likely it is to choose greenﬁeld
FDI (both wholly owned and joint venture) rather than M&A. A large host
market and low host wage both favor greenﬁeld FDI relative to M&A.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Finally, we examine the trade-oﬀ between FDI and exports, taking into
account the diﬀerent options the home ﬁrm has in choosing its investment
and ownership mode. More precisely, we have to compare export proﬁts with
those of the ﬁrm’s preferred combination of investment and ownership modes.
This comparison yields the following result:
Result 4 The home ﬁrm is more likely to prefer FDI to exporting the more
productive it is, the larger is the foreign market, the greater is the home
10relative to the foreign wage, the higher is the transportation cost, and the
smaller is the sunk cost of investment.
Proof: see Appendix A.3.
The reasons for this result are straightforward: ﬁrst, FDI is more prof-
itable relative to exporting the lower are production costs in the foreign
country; second, the larger are the home ﬁrm’s sales in the foreign coun-
try (large foreign market, or high productivity of the home ﬁrm) the more
attractive it is to save transportation costs.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our dataset consists of Japanese foreign direct investments in 21 developed
countries during the period 1985 to 2000.10 We restrict our sample to invest-
ments in developed countries for two reasons: First, we only consider host
countries that did not impose local ownership requirements, i.e., rules typ-
ically forcing foreign investors into joint ventures with local partners. This
eliminates many developing countries, simply because they impose such re-
quirements. Second, we want to be consistent with our theoretical analysis
which concentrated on horizontal investment—and this type of investment
takes place mostly between developed countries.11
Table 1 details the 759 investments that comprise this study. 285 Japanese
manufacturing multinational enterprises (MNEs) were responsible for 578
investments into manufacturing aﬃliates, for an average of 2 investments
per parent ﬁrm. Wholly owned subsidiaries accounted for over 44% of all
manufacturing aﬃliates, with joint ventures and M&As totaling 39% and
17%, respectively. Since we do not have destination-speciﬁc export data for
our sample ﬁrms, we cannot directly observe which ﬁrms supplied our sample
of host countries through exporting. However, we are able to determine which
10See Appendix A.4 for a description of the data and data sources.
11Most of the cross-border M&A activity in the world takes place between developed
countries. Between 1988 and 2003, the ratio of cross-border M&As between developed
countries to world cross-border M&As never dropped below 77%, reaching a peak in 1988
at over 97% (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 411).
11Japanese manufacturers established wholesale/retail aﬃliates in a particular
country. We let these ﬁrms represent the exporters in our sample, although
we realize that there are exporters that use independent distributors to sell
their products abroad, for instance, by going through a trading company
within the same keiretsu (i.e., business group).12 The sample contains 181
wholesale and retail aﬃliates established by 100 Japanese manufacturers that
do not have manufacturing aﬃliates in the sample countries.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Our model suggests that ﬁrm productivity plays an important role in the
market-entry decision. One way to capture productivity is by computing a
ﬁrm’s TFP. We calculate two measures of TFP: one using the Levinsohn-
Petrin (2003) approach (TFP), and an “Approximate Total Factor Produc-
tivity” (ATFP) using the approach of Grilliches and Mairesse (1990).13 In
addition to the TFP measures, we also observe several other variables that
are positively correlated with ﬁrm productivity, such as the ﬁrm’s R&D inten-
sity (R&D), total assets (Size) and total sales (Sales). Other parent-speciﬁc
characteristics, such as market capitalization (Mkt. Cap), global export per-
centage (Exports), age (FirmAge), and keiretsu membership (Keiretsu), vary
in their degree of correlation to productivity but can serve as further controls.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 3 gives the mean values for each of these variables across all
Japanese parents, with each variable measured with a one-year lag from
the investment date. Table 2 provides the correlation matrix of the major
ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. Note that Size and Sales are highly correlated
(0.958), as are the ATFP and TFP measures (0.826), while Size and Sales are
also somewhat correlated with our TFP measures. Relatively low pair-wise
correlation exists between the remaining variables.
12We do, however, control for keiretsu membership.
13Data descriptions and sources are provided in Appendix A.4.
12[Insert Table 3 about here]
As indicated at the top of Table 3 for the whole sample of ﬁrms, ﬁrms
that establish wholly-owned subsidiaries tend to have higher TFP levels and
be larger (both in Size and Sales) on average than those engaging in joint
ventures, and these in turn tend to be larger and more productive than ﬁrms
that opt for M&A; the latter are bigger and more productive on average
than ﬁrms that only export. The pattern looks somewhat diﬀerent for the
other ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. For instance, ﬁrms establishing aﬃliates
via M&A have the highest export ratio at the time of investment.
We perform ANOVA analysis to test the hypothesis that the mean val-
ues for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristic are equivalent across each investment
type.14 The top section of Table 3 reveals signiﬁcant heterogeneity among
the parent ﬁrms in regard to our productivity measures (TFP, Size, Sales).
However, since this heterogeneity may arise simply from the inclusion of the
ﬁrms that only export, we re-ran the ANOVA tests only for parents with
manufacturing aﬃliates. We ﬁnd that the heterogeneity in all of our produc-
tivity measures remains, although this is not true for keiretsu membership,
suggesting the heterogeneity in this measure did result from the inclusion of
the exporter ﬁrms.15
We also perform similar ANOVA analysis for each of the three largest in-
vesting industries separately, namely chemicals and related products (based
on U.S. SIC 28), industrial equipment and machinery (SIC 35), and elec-
tronic and electric equipment (SIC 36); see Table 3. The results from the
ANOVA analysis suggest that for each industry signiﬁcant heterogeneity ex-
ists among investment-mode choices in regard to TFP and Size. For the
chemical industry, the choice of entry strategy also appears to be signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent depending on the ﬁrms’ market capitalization. In both the
industrial machinery and electronics industries, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant hetero-
geneity across nearly all ﬁrm-level characteristics. To eliminate the inﬂuence
14ANOVA is employed to avoid the increased likelihood of Type-I error associated with
the use of multiple pairwise t-tests, although a drawback is that the test cannot indicate
which mean value(s) signiﬁcantly diﬀer(s) from the others.
15These results are available upon request.
13of the export-only parents in the latter two industries, we carried out an
ANOVA analysis only for ﬁrms with manufacturing aﬃliates abroad. The
results conﬁrm that there exists signiﬁcant ﬁrm-level heterogeneity in the
investment- and ownership-mode choices of manufacturers.
Our model indicates that we should also control for country- and industry-
speciﬁc determinants, speciﬁcally market size, wage rates and industry con-
centration. Therefore, we include as regressors several variables capturing
host-speciﬁc characteristics, which are typically measured at the industry
level. Ind. Production measures industry-level production. Ind. Concentra-
tion measures production concentration, and is calculated as a host’s share
(%) of total employment within a particular industry. In regard to wage
rates, we determine both Foreign Wages, as measured by the host’s industry-
speciﬁc wage rate, and the Relative Wage, measured as the diﬀerence between
the Japanese and the host’s wage rate. We also proxy for transportation
costs with Distance, measured as the great-circle distance between Tokyo and
host’s capital city. Finally, as these variables do not control for all industry-
level diﬀerences, we also include dummy variables for each host, aﬃliate
industry, and year.
While the model suggests that sunk costs play a role in the ownership
choice sequence, directly measuring sunk costs (Sunk Costs) is diﬃcult.
Therefore, we proxy sunk costs by exit costs, suggesting that the greater
the exit costs faced by ﬁrms, the less likely ﬁrms will leave the market. The
primary measure we use to proxy for exit costs is the OECD’s (1999) Em-
ployment Protection Legislation index, which measures the strictness of a
host’s labor market policies for individual dismissals for both regular and
temporary workers.16
We also wish to control for country characteristics that inﬂuence the
ﬁrm’s choice, but do not explicitly appear in the model, including corpo-
rate taxes, and exchange-rate eﬀects that could aﬀect the price of assets
denominated in the local currency. The respective proxies are the corpo-
rate tax rates (TaxRates), and the Yen per local currency exchange rate
16See Gross and Ryan (2007) for a link between FDI activity and this EPL index.
14(Exchange Rates). We control for a ﬁrm’s previous investment experience
by creating variables indicating a ﬁrm’s previous manufacturing investment
into each host (PrevFDI Host) as well as the rest of the countries in the
sample (PrevFDI Sample). We are also able to control for a ﬁrm’s previous
ownership choice decisions, namely the previous amount of WOS investments
(PrevWOS Sample and PrevWOS Host, for use in the WOS-JV decision) as
well as the previous amount of greenﬁeld investment (PrevGR Sample and
PrevGR Host, for the greenﬁeld-M&A choice).
4 Empirical Framework and Results
In our theoretical framework we explored a ﬁrm’s sequential decision problem,
where it ﬁrst has to decide between FDI and exporting. If it opts for FDI,
it has to choose between M&A and greenﬁeld investment. If it decides to
enter via greenﬁeld investment, it faces the choice between a wholly owned
subsidiary and a joint venture. The ﬁrm’s choice at each stage obviously
depends upon the proﬁts associated with each alternative. We can write the
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observe the ﬁrm’s actual choice at each stage. That is, we can work with an
indicator variable yi












In a sequential decision structure the probability of ﬁrm i choosing a
particular market-entry mode j will be determined as the product of the
conditional probabilities at each decision stage. We denote the probability
of a ﬁrm choosing strategy f = 1,2 at stage 1 by Pf, where f = 1 denotes
15FDI, and f = 2 denotes exporting. The conditional probability of choosing
strategy m = 1,2 at stage 2 given that the ﬁrm has chosen FDI is P1m, where
m = 1 indicates greenﬁeld investment, and m = 2 indicates M&A. Finally,
at stage 3 the probability of selecting ownership mode l = 1,2 conditional on
the ﬁrm having chosen greenﬁeld FDI is P11l, where l = 1 stands for whole










If we let the variables xfml,yfm,and zf be vectors of explanatory vari-
ables speciﬁc to each stage, then (following Greene, 2003) we can write the








and the inclusive value at this stage as
IVfm = ln{Σn exp(xfmnβ)}.
where the inclusive value is sum of the proﬁts across all choices within the
stage, and represents the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts based on the characteristics
of possible choices at this stage.18 As this value aﬀects the choice of greenﬁeld
versus M&A, we include it in the probability of choosing alternative m in





Σk exp(yfkα + θfkIVfk)
with the inclusive value at this stage determined by
IVf = ln{Σk exp(yfkα + θfkIVfk)}.





18Inclusive values are often called ’dissimilarity parameters’, as they indicate the degree
of dissimilarity between alternatives within an individual nest. When all the IV parameter
values equal one, the model collapses into a conditional logit model.





Σd exp(zdϕ + γdIVd)
The sequential decision tree suggests the use of a 3-level nested logit
model. Our structure is characterized as ’partially degenerate’ as some, but
not all, of our upper level nests have multiple lower level alternatives. For
instance, the ﬁrm has only a single alternative if it chooses to export in
the ﬁrst stage or M&A in the second stage, whereas choosing FDI in the
ﬁrst stage, and greenﬁeld investment in the second stage, both provide the
ﬁrm multiple alternatives. As a result, we use the non-normalized nested logit
speciﬁcation of Ben-Akiva (1973), which has been shown to be consistent with
McFadden’s (1978, 1981) random utility maximization speciﬁcation when the
inclusive value parameters are restricted to equality (Koppelman and Wen,
1998). Hunt (2000) shows this condition holds when partially degenerate
nests exist within the model structure. We impose the IV equality restriction
in our estimation.
4.1 3-Stage Nested Logit Results
Table 4 provides the results of our estimation procedures, with the inde-
pendent variables divided by stage. Coeﬃcients for variables aﬀecting the
WOS-JV decision (3rd stage) are at the bottom of the table, coeﬃcients for
variables in the M&A-Greenﬁeld decision (2nd stage) stage are in the middle
of the table, and coeﬃcient estimates for the Export-FDI (1st stage) deci-
sion nest are at the top. Columns (1)-(4) of the table are regressions that
correspond to our base model as predicted by the above theory, with the
diﬀerences across columns arising from how we measure productivity (TFP,
ATFP,R&D). In columns (5) and (6), we provide coeﬃcient estimates from
our extended model, which includes variables not explicitly accounted for in
our theory. In all regressions, positive coeﬃcient estimates signal an increased
likelihood of WOS (3rd stage), Greenﬁeld investment (2nd stage) and FDI (1st
stage). To save space, we do not report the coeﬃcients on the industry, host-
country, or time-speciﬁc dummy variables.
17[Insert Table 4 about here]
4.1.1 Base Model Results
In the regressions characterizing our base model, our empirical estimations
generally conﬁrm our theory at each investment stage. We focus ﬁrst on the
productivity measure, as this variable is the only variable that appears in
each stage. Regardless of the measure (TFP, ATFP, R&D), increased ﬁrm
productivity leads to a greater likelihood of FDI in stage 1. However, the
coeﬃcients on ATFP (both 2nd and 3rd stages) and R&D (3rd stage) have the
correct sign but are insigniﬁcant. This is not surprising, as while the three
measures are positively correlated with one another, in several cases this
correlation is quite low (see Table 2). As increased R&D expenditures lead
to greater likelihood of FDI and Greenﬁeld investment, it is a bit surprising
to ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant R&D measure in the ownership choice stage (stage 3).
However, as we cannot control for characteristics of the actual JV partner
that the Japanese ﬁrm may take, it may be the case that R&D synergies
exist between the Japanese parent and a local ﬁrm such that choosing entry
via a joint venture may occur. Finally, we include both TFP and R&D in
the regression (column (4)), with no signiﬁcant impact on the results.
Turning to stage-speciﬁc variables in the base model, we ﬁnd that in-
creased Ind. Concentration leads to greater whole ownership (Stage 3) of the
aﬃliate, regardless of the productivity measure, suggesting that a greater
number of potential JV partners (lower industry concentration) increases
the JV likelihood. Like in our model, market size has no eﬀect on the choice
of ownership mode. In stage 2, larger host markets (Industrial Production),
smaller Sunk Costs, and increases in exchange rate (Exchange Rate) lead to
increased Greenﬁeld investment. In stage 1, larger host country size (Ind.
Production) and Distance (as a proxy for transportation costs) both lead to
greater FDI. In addition, the larger the diﬀerence between the industry-level
Japanese and host country wage rate (Relative Wage), the more attractive
is foreign production. Finally, in accordance with our theory, we ﬁnd that
greater employment protection, our measure of sunk costs (Sunk Costs), de-
creases FDI.
184.1.2 Extended Model Results
While the results from our base case (columns 1-4) suggest that our theory
withstands the scrutiny of empirical investigation, there are numerous other
variables that we do not explicitly account for that may also aﬀect investment
and ownership choice at each investment stage. Therefore, in columns (5)
and (6), we extend our base model to include numerous other ﬁrm- and host-
speciﬁc explanatory variables. While we added these variables separately to
best capture their individual aﬀect, we limit our reporting of the extended
model to these two additional columns.19
In column (5), we include a ﬁrm’s global export sales percentage (Export),
its age (Firm Age), its market capitalization (Mkt. Cap), the Yen/local cur-
rency exchange rate (Exchange Rate), and the host’s top corporate tax rate
(Tax Rates). In the third stage, only Exports has a signiﬁcant impact on the
WOS-JV choice. In the second stage, only the Yen/local currency exchange
rate aﬀects the Greenﬁeld-M&A choice. The positive coeﬃcient on the Ex-
change Rate variable suggests that the cost of acquiring a local ﬁrm’s assets
through M&A grows with increases in the Yen/host country exchange rate,
leading to a greater likelihood of Greenﬁeld investment. In the ﬁrst stage,
only Firm Age aﬀects the FDI/export decision, as older ﬁrms were more
likely to undertake FDI. Interestingly, previous Export sales do not aﬀect
the FDI/export decision, a result that is in part driven by the fact that we
can only control for global export sales, and not host-speciﬁc exports.
In column (6), we add the ﬁrm’s keiretsu status (Keiretsu), measured as
a dummy variable with the value 1 taken by ﬁrms that are keiretsu members.
The coeﬃcient estimates for Keiretsu are not statistically signiﬁcant in each
stage. In addition, we include two ’previous investment history’ variables at
each stage: the ﬁrst measures previous investment into the group of sample
countries, with the second measuring previous investment into the particu-
lar host county. In stage 3, positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates are
found for both the ﬁrm’s previous number of WOS aﬃliates in the entire host
19The entire set of extended model regressions are available from the authors upon
request. In general, these two columns best represent each variable’s impact.
19country sample (Prev. WOS Sample) as well as for the particular host (Prev.
WOS Host) are noted, suggesting some hysteresis in ownership choice exists
throughout a ﬁrm’s investment sequence. This hysteresis exists for both the
1st and 2nd stages as well, as in each case, both of the previous investment his-
tory variables are positive and signiﬁcant. In all three stages, the coeﬃcients
on the two history variables are nearly identical, indicating similar impacts
on entry and ownership strategies, even if investments occurred in diﬀerent
countries. This suggests that, at least for the (primarily) European countries
that comprise our sample, overall investment experience is as important as
experience within a given host.
4.1.3 Robustness Tests for the Three-stage Model
Table 5 outlines the results when we test several additional sunk costs prox-
ies.20 While the OECD’s (1999) EPL index has a longer time frame than
other hiring/ﬁring cost measures (such as the Global Competitiveness Re-
port) and provides data on our entire host country sample, a drawback is
that it is only covers individual dismissals. To check the robustness of these
results, we use the OECD’s (1999) ”Collective Dismissals Index”, which is a
better representation of ﬁrm shutdown/exit than individual dismissals. How-
ever, this data is only collected for the late 1990s period, and restricting the
sample to include only the late 1990s leaves us with very few observations.
Therefore, we apply the CDI index for the entire sample period, recognizing
that we lose signiﬁcant time series variation in doing so. Not surprisingly, the
estimated coeﬃcients on the Sunk Cost variable are still signiﬁcant, but now
only at the 10% level.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
An additional measure of sunk costs is the ’Death Rate’ data found in
the OECD’s (2007) Business Demography Indicators.21 This data set captures
20We restrict the table to just the 1st and 2nd stages, as these are the stages where,
according to the model, sunk costs matter.
21Eurostat also publishes a death rate statistic. As its correlation with the OECD mea-
sure is high (0.879), we omit the Eurostat results.
20annual sector-level death rates in several of our host countries beginning in
1995, although no data is provided for France, Germany, and Canada, re-
ducing our dataset by almost 40% (from 759 to 455 observations). In column
(2) we employ only the manufacturing sector death rate data, and ﬁnd that
the coeﬃcient estimates on the sunk costs variable are not statistically sig-
niﬁcant, likely the result of the signiﬁcant drop in observations. Using the
national-level death rate (column 3), we ﬁnd a similar result. As the cor-
relation between the manufacturing-sector and national-level death rates is
0.928, the similar results in these two columns are expected.22
4.1.4 A Two-stage Model
A problem with sequential models, as noted by Greene (2000), is the ad
hoc partitioning of the choice set which may lead to results which might
depend on the deﬁned branches. We wish to investigate whether our three-
stage sequential model is robust to changes in the ﬁrm’s decision sequence.
For instance, it may be the case that a ﬁrm does not view the investment
decision as a three-stage sequence, as assumed in our model, but rather as
a two-stage process, in which the ﬁrst stage (FDI versus exporting) remains
the same, but the second and third stage are merged into a single stage. In
this new second stage, the ﬁrm would then choose between entry via M&A,
WOS, or JV.
As a result, we reestimate our model using a two-stage nested logit model,
where the partial degeneracy of the export branch remains. We maintain our
imposed IV equality restriction in this estimation. The results of this esti-
mation are in Table 6, where the top portion indicates the 1st stage FDI
versus export choice, and the bottom portion reﬂects the 2nd stage FDI en-
22Other variables’ robustness was also examined; however, as these changes did not
aﬀect the qualitative results, we do not include them in Table 5. Such changes include:
for Exchange Rate, a switch from a Yen/local currency measure to a Yen/$ measure; for
Firm Age, we move the birthdate of the ﬁrm to 1970, the ﬁrst year that Japanese ﬁrms
could invest abroad without prior approval of the Japanese government (see Mason, 1994);
and for Exports, we interact it with an industry-level Japanese export sales percentage
(data source: World Bank’s Trade and Production Database), which would indicate that
if a particular host receives 10% of a Japanese industry’s exports, all ﬁrms within that
industry sent 10% of their global exports to that host.
21try/ownership choice decision. Column (1) reﬂects our base case estimation,
while column (2) provides the full extended model. In both cases, entry via
WOS serves as the comparison group in the second stage; therefore, positive
(negative) coeﬃcient estimates signal an increased (decreased) likelihood of
entry in that mode as compared to WOS entry.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The two-stage model provides similar estimation results to the three-stage
model for our base variables, especially for the ﬁrst stage, where no quali-
tative diﬀerences in the results are noted between the two- and three-stage
models. In the second stage, the variable estimates in the M&A comparison
are qualitatively similar to the stage 2 results in our base three-stage model.
More productive ﬁrms enter via wholly owned FDI, and greater sunk costs
lead to greater entry via M&A.
Interestingly, however, is that the WOS-JV comparison in the two-stage
model does provide slightly diﬀerent qualitative results. We ﬁnd insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcient estimates on the TFP variable, which is diﬀerent than the signif-
icant (but only at the 10- level) TFP coeﬃcient in the three-stage model.
This result may arise from the inclusion of Sunk Costs, Industry Production,
and Foreign Wage to this set of estimations, variables that were not part of
the third stage in our three-stage base estimations. Note, however, that none
of these additional variables signiﬁcantly impacted the WOS-JV relation-
ship, as was predicted in our theory, and thus excluded from our three-stage
estimations.
As both the three-stage and two-stage models yield similar results, a
test to determine the optimal tree structure is appropriate. While there is
no well-deﬁned testing procedure for discriminating among tree structures
(Greene, 2003), we can nevertheless assess the relative goodness of ﬁt of
the two models via both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the
Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). To do so, we compare similar ﬁrst-
stage regressions in both the 3-stage and 2-stage models (e.g., columns 4 and
6 in Table 4 with column 1 and 2 in Table 6). Both the AIC and SIC criteria
yield lower values for the 3-stage models than the 2-stage models, suggesting
22that the 3-stage model is the preferred estimation model. Thus, while both
the three-stage and two-stage frameworks produce similar estimation results,
given its close relation to our theoretical set-up and the AIC/SIC criteria
tests, we believe that the three-stage model is the better model in which to
examine the market-entry decision.23
5 Conclusions
The paper examined how a manufacturer supplies goods to a foreign mar-
ket, representing this decision as a three-stage process. In the ﬁrst stage, the
manufacturer decides whether to export or to invest in the foreign country.
In the second stage, the manufacturer chooses the investment mode: green-
ﬁeld investment or M&A. If he opts for greenﬁeld investment, the third-
stage decision is whether to establish a wholly owned subsidiary or to form
a joint venture with a local partner. We constructed a model to show how
these choices are interrelated and how they are determined by total factor
productivity and other ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, as well as by industry-
and country-level variables. We then confronted the model with ﬁrm-level
Japanese data and found that its main predictions were conﬁrmed. In par-
ticular, we found that, controlling for industry- and country-speciﬁc factors,
the higher is a ﬁrm’s total factor productivity, the more likely it is to choose
whole ownership rather than a joint venture, greenﬁeld investment rather
than M&A, and FDI rather than exporting. These results indicate that ﬁrm-
speciﬁc characteristics play an important role in determining the pattern of
FDI and that we hence should observe considerable heterogeneity in the in-
vestment and ownership mode choices of ﬁrms even within the same industry.
This suggests that a consideration of ﬁrm-level determinants adds a signiﬁ-
cant new dimension to the FDI literature, that has traditionally relied only
23We also analyze a single-staged multinomial logit model with four possible alternatives
(M&A, WOS, JV, Exporting). Hausman tests indicate the IIA assumption fails in this set-
up (test results are omitted for space considerations, but available from the authors). In
addition, this model does not ﬁt our theoretical framework as there is no outside alternative
in case a ﬁrm’s M&A oﬀer is rejected. For these reasons, we omit discussion of these
estimations.
23on industry- and country-speciﬁc factors to explain FDI patterns.
The selection of diﬀerent ﬁrms within an industry into diﬀerent invest-
ment and ownership modes should also be taken into account when analyzing
the eﬀects of FDI, for instance, on local ﬁrms, market structure and social
welfare (see, for instance, Aitken and Harrison, 1999). For example, there
is widespread public concern that cross-border M&As may be less beneﬁ-
cial than greenﬁeld FDI or may even have negative eﬀects on host-country
welfare. M&As are often seen simply as a transfer of ownership, whereas
greenﬁeld FDI is perceived as adding to the capital stock of the host country
and creating jobs. More importantly, M&As are seen as reducing competition
in the host market (UNCTAD, 2000, p. 14, 15). By providing an explanation
for which ﬁrms are likely to choose one strategy rather than the other our
paper provides a potentially important input into the analysis of these issues.
Appendix
A.1 Whole Ownership versus Joint Venture
Greenﬁeld investment implies that the home ﬁrm, ﬁrm 1, makes an invest-
ment in the host country at a cost of F. All n ﬁrms hence have plants in the
host country. If ﬁrm 1 operates a wholly owned subsidiary, denoted by the




A + nα1 − α2
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, (A.1)
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− F, (A.2)
where A = a − wf −
Pn
k=3 αk.
In case of a joint venture, denoted by the superscript J, the market struc-
ture does not change as all ﬁrms remain independent. The equilibrium output
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If ﬁrm 1 can obtain a positive proﬁt under both investment options, i.e.,
min{ΠW
1 ,ΠJ
1} ≥ 0, then a comparison between (A.2) and (A.4) reveals that
ﬁrm 1 prefers whole ownership to a joint venture with ﬁrm 2 if
α1 ≥
1 + (n − 1)γ
n − (n − 1)γ
α2. (A.5)
Since we assume that α1 ≥ α2, (A.5) implies that a joint venture is possible
only if γ > 1/2. The choice between whole ownership and joint venture also
depends on market structure, since for γ > 1/2 the right-hand side of (A.5)
is increasing in n. That is, the smaller is n (and hence the more concentrated
is the industry), the more likely the home ﬁrm is to choose whole ownership.
This proves Result 1.
A.2 M&A versus Greenﬁeld Investment
In case of a merger, denoted by the superscript M, the merged ﬁrm competes
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The acquisition price of a successful merger depends on the choice ﬁrm 1
would make if ﬁrm 2 turned down its oﬀer. Suppose that ΠJ
1 ≥ ΠW
1 , so that
ﬁrm 1 would propose a joint venture in case ﬁrm 2 rejected the merger oﬀer.
Firm 2 would have to be oﬀered an acquisition price of at least ΠJ
2, namely
the proﬁt ﬁrm 2 would receive by rejecting the oﬀer. If, on the other hand,
ΠJ
1 < ΠW




1 , ﬁrm 1 prefers a joint venture to a merger, if ΠJ
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The left-hand side of (A.8) is increasing in α1 and decreasing in b, wf and
F. This proves Result 2.
If ΠJ
1 < ΠW
1 , ﬁrm 1 will choose a wholly owned greenﬁeld investment
rather than a merger, if ΠW
1 ≥ ΠM
1 − ΠW
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The indiﬀerence curve between greenﬁeld FDI and M&A in (α1,α2)-space
must lie everywhere on or below a line with a slope of −1. If we increase α1
and reduce α2 by the same amount, i.e., dα1 = −dα2, the right-hand side of
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. (A.10)
Note that if α1 = α2, then
dα2









¯ > 1. Hence starting at α1 = α2 and increasing α1 by
increments dα1 means that α2 has to fall by more than dα1 to keep the left-
hand side of (A.9) constant. As one continues to raise α1, the denominator
of (A.10) may become negative; this implies that the line representing the
combinations of α1 and α2 for which the left-hand side of (A.9) stays constant
ﬁrst becomes vertical and then bends backward so that both α1 and α2 have
to fall to keep the left-hand side of (A.9) the same. The indiﬀerence curve
between greenﬁeld investment and M&A must have a slope that lies between
26−1 (the value that keeps the right-hand side of (A.9) unchanged) and (A.10).
Hence greenﬁeld FDI is preferred if α1 is suﬃciently big.
Note that (A.9) is also aﬀected by the other parameters of the model.
An increase in host-country market size (lower b) makes greenﬁeld FDI more
attractive as does a lower F and a smaller γ. The impact of a reduction in
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The derivative is positive if A is suﬃciently large and/or γ is small; in this
case, a reduction in the host-country wage makes greenﬁeld investment more
likely relative to M&A. This proves Result 3.
A.3 FDI versus Exporting
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1 − F}. This comparison yields Result
4.
A.4 Data
The FDI data employed in this study is compiled from several issues of Toyo
Keizai Inc.’s Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran. This dataset provides the date
and location of initial investment into (or acquisition of) the foreign aﬃliate.
We focus on those investments for which (1) the aﬃliate was in an industry
27for which no local ownership requirements existed at that time (UNCTC),
(2) the principal Japanese investor held an equity ownership share of at least
10%, (3) all of the relevant ownership characteristics are known (as described
below), and (4) the investment occurred during the period between 1985 and
2000 in one of the sample countries.
For a consistent and detailed determination of the foreign aﬃliate’s in-
dustry aﬃliation, we collected the ﬁrm’s primary 4-digit SIC code for the
year of initial investment (acquisition). Aﬃliate main business line informa-
tion was located in numerous publicly available European sources, as well
as from the main oﬃces of most national foreign investment agencies (e.g.,
STATEC [Luxembourg], Invest in France Agency, Invest in Sweden Agency)
for those aﬃliates too small in size to gain entry into the published corporate
listings. Main business lines reported in earlier SIC revisions (1972, 1977) or
in the European NACE format were converted to the 1987 SIC equivalent by
standard classiﬁcation concordances.
A wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) is deﬁned as an aﬃliate of a single
Japanese investor not established via M&A (with the parent company holding
at least a 95% equity share in the aﬃliate). A joint venture (JV) is an aﬃliate
not created through M&A, in which none of the investors holds greater than
a 95% equity stake (lowering this to a 90% threshold does not aﬀect our
results). Finally, an M&A investment occurs when the foreign aﬃliate is
established via merger or acquisition. For the purposes of this paper, any
investment through a merger/acquisition is considered an M&A, regardless
of the number of investing parents. Note that 88% of the M&As in the sample
were established by a single Japanese parent, with an average ownership
percentage of 91%. Less then 10% of M&As had Japanese parents with less
than 50% ownership.
A.4.1 Parent-Speciﬁc Characteristics
For each investment, the Japanese ﬁrm with the largest equity ownership
share is considered the primary investor. In the case (rare in our data)
where there is a 50-50 joint venture between Japanese partners, we con-
sider the primary investor to be the ﬁrm listed ﬁrst by Toyo Keizai for that
28investment. Parent 4-digit SIC codes were located in Dun and Bradstreet’s
Principal International Businesses, National Register’s Directory of Corpo-
rate Aﬃliations, and other publicly available sources. Various issues of Toyo
Keizai’s Japan Company Handbook as well as the Paciﬁc-Basin Capital Mar-
kets Database (PACAP) (2003) provided the information used to calculate
a ﬁrm’s TFP, ATFP, R&D intensity (R&D, measured as R&D expenditure
as a percentage of total sales), Sales (as shown in Table 3), Exports, Firm
Age, and Mkt. Cap, which is calculated as the year end stock price multiplied
by the number of available common shares. Dodwell Marketing’s Industrial
Groupings in Japan was used to determine the investing ﬁrm’s keiretsu mem-
bership (Keiretsu) status. The variables used to calculate a ﬁrm’s previous
investment totals are derived from the Toyo Keizai Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo
Soran.
The Japan Company Handbook and PACAP database also were used to
determine a ﬁrm’s “Approximate Total Factor Productivity” (ATFP), cal-
culated as ATFP = lnQ/L − slnK/L, where Q,L and K denote output,
employment and capital, respectively, with s = 1/3. This follows Grilliches
and Mairesse (1990). A concern in regard to calculating ATFP—or any total
factor productivity measure for that matter—is the simultaneity bias asso-
ciated with its computation. This bias arises, because the ﬁrm can observe
its output and change its factor input mix, yielding biased OLS estimates
of the production function and, therefore, biased productivity estimates. As
our dataset provides information on ﬁrm-level intermediate input purchases,
we can correct for this bias by employing Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003)
estimation technique and the accompanying STATA program. While highly
correlated with the ATFP measure (as noted in Table 2), the Levinsohn-
Petrin TFP (TFP) measure is the more econometrically consistent of the
two measures.
A.4.2 Country-Speciﬁc Characteristics
The countries included in this sample are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
29land, and the UK. Data for Ind. Production and Ind. Concentration are
found in the OECD STAN (2005) dataset. Data for industry-level wage rates
(ForeignWages) and the RelativeWage variables are from the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics ’Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers in
Manufacturing’ data, which is reported U.S. dollars. Tax Rates, measured
as the host’s top corporate tax rate, is courtesy of the University of Michi-
gan’s Oﬃce of Tax Policy Research. Exchange rates are determined from
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics CD-ROM.
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Figure 1: Joint venture vs M&A vs wholly-owned subsidiary
34Table 1: FDI Data Description







# w/ Manuf. Invst. 285
Avg. per Parent 2.02
# w/ Whlsle/Retl Invst. 100
Avg. per Parent 1.81
Notes: * - percentage of manufacturing investments
Table 2: Correlation of Firm-Speciﬁc Characteristics
TFP ATFP Size Sales MktCap Export R&D KeiretsuMember
TFP 1
ATFP 0.826 1
Size 0.558 0.542 1
Sales 0.571 0.408 0.958 1
Mkt. Cap 0.022 0.037 -0.005 0.013 1
Exports 0.030 0.035 0.079 0.100 -0.074 1
R&D 0.115 0.217 0.207 0.173 -0.050 0.048 1
Keiretsu 0.356 0.377 0.270 0.255 -0.110 0.003 0.191 1
35Table 3: Means of Firm-Speciﬁc Characteristics
Joint Whlsale/ ANOVA
All Firms M&A WOS Venture Retail F-stat p-value
TFP 3.329 3.397 3.352 3.180 8.15 2.45e-5*
Sizea 402,158 697,752 485,211 122,044 18.192 2.11e-11*
Salesa 352,687 742,073 494,970 101,861 17.514 5.34e-11
Mkt. Capb 2.03e+7 1.75e+7 1.79e+7 2.87e+7 0.551 0.648
Export% 26.39 23.83 17.82 23.01 1.789 0.148
R&D 3.83 4.38 4.41 4.12 0.905 0.438
Keiretsuc 0.606 0.655 0.679 0.436 10.068 1.65e-6*
SIC 28
TFP 3.328 3.401 3.349 3.174 1.117 0.096***
Sizea 500,438 363,568 308,876 126,813 7.611 1.10e-4*
Salesa 395,733 297,521 304,239 98,284 6.023 7.65e-4
Mkt. Capb 7.89e+6 6.96e+6 1.42e+7 7.03e+7 2.372 0.074***
Export% 10.17 8.03 12.15 11.20 1.819 0.148
R&D% 4.80 5.47 5.30 5.94 0.448 0.719
Keiretsuc 0.684 0.692 0.824 0.800 0.862 0.462
SIC 35
TFP 3.322 3.382 3.371 3.201 2.188 0.073***
Sizea 414,426 732,571 536,858 74,501 8.915 1.79e-5*
Salesa 340,882 765,330 535,699 57,908 7.843 6.75e-5*
Mkt. Capb 1.31e+7 9.19e+5 6.70e+6 1.51e+7 2.786 0.043**
Export% 18.94 27.76 21.69 25.14 1.515 0.213
R&D% 3.37 4.51 4.55 3.03 3.859 0.011**
Keiretsuc 0.556 0.694 0.724 0.310 7.875 6.49e-5*
SIC 36
TFP 3.332 3.403 3.347 3.177 4.193 0.007*
Sizea 269,801 669,471 612,553 73,536 3.623 0.015**
Salesa 220,013 662,941 618,850 59,044 3.396 0.020**
Mkt. Capb 1.72e+7 3.57e+6 6.80e+6 5.43e+7 2.944 0.036**
Export% 24.42 35.49 24.45 28.49 2.596 0.055***
R&D% 4.87 4.51 4.23 4.87 0.367 0.777
Keiretsuc 0.750 0.706 0.546 0.171 10.856 2.13e-6*
Notes: a - Millions of Yen, b - Billions of Yen, c - Measured as a dummy
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table 5: Robustness Test of Sunk Cost Estimates in Three-Stage Nested
Logit Model
(1) (2) (3)
FDI vs. Export (Stage 1)
TFP 0.907a (0.211) 0.907a (0.210) 0.907a (0.210)
R&D 0.738c (0.400) 0.737c (0.400) 0.737c (0.399)
Sunk Costs Collective Dismissal -0.147c (0.075) . .
Sunk Costs Manufacturing Exits . 0.123 (0.077) .
Sunk Costs Country Exits 0.103 (0.627)
Ind. Production 1.323c (0.713) 1.320c (0.719) 1.319c (0.720)
Relative Wage 0.618c (0.333) 0.615c (0.331) 0.616c (0.331)
Distance 0.216c (0.117) 0. 216c (0.118) 0.216 (0.119)
Greenﬁeld vs M&A (Stage 2)
TFP 0.231c (0.121) 0.230c (0.122) 0.230c (0.122)
R&D 3.079b (1.411) 3.070b (1.387) 3.069b (1.388)
Sunk Costs Collective Dismissal 0.083c (0.043) . .
Sunk Costs Manufacturing Exits . 0.078 (0.052) .
Sunk Costs Country Exits . . 0.081 (0.051)
Ind. Production 1.403b (0.651) 1.403b (0.655) 1.402b (0.655)
Foreign Wage -0.453c (0.258) -0.455c (0.261) -0.454c (0.261)
Obs. 759 455 470
Log-Likelihood -511.147 -318.124 -324.317
LR test 144.71 58.18 61.21
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parenthesis. Time, country, and industry dummy variables
included.a,b,c-signiﬁcant at the 1%,5% and 10%-levels, respectively.
38Table 6: A Two-Stage Model of Ownership Choice and Entry Decisions
(1) (2)
First Stage (FDI vs Export)
TFP 0.712a (0.259) 0.710a (0.247)
R&D 0.444b (0.216) 0.442b (0.218)
Sunk Costs -0.118c (0.061) -0.118c (0.061)
Ind. Production 0.989c (0.513) 0.986c (0.511)
Relative Wage 0.342c (0.175) 0.342c (0.177)
Distance 0.189c (0.101) 0.188c (0.101)
Exports . 0.009 (0.006)
Firm Age . 0.008b (0.004)
Mkt. Cap . 0.547 (0.441)
Exchange Rate . 0.007 (0.022)
Tax Rates . 0.972 (1.113)
Prev. FDI Sample . 0.099a (0.042)
Prev. FDI Host . 0.094a (0.041)
Keiretsu . 0.407 (0.511)
Second Stage (WOS vs. M&A vs. JV)
M&A JV M&A JV
TFP -0.638b (0.309) 0.027 (0.287) -0.636b (0.311) 0.027 (0.289)
R&D -0.717b (0.354) 0.114 (0.101) -0.714b (0.361) 0.118 (0.103)
Sunk Costs 0.171b (0.084) 0.109 (0.142) 0.171b (0.086) 0.110 (0.137)
Ind. Production 1.386 (0.811) 0.571 (0.611) 1.371 (0.789) 0.571 (0.614)
Ind. Concentration -0.214c (0.111) -0.408c (0.211) -0.212c (0.112) -0.408c (0.213)
Foreign Wage -0.387c (0.201) 0.214 (0.178) -0.385c (0.201) 0.212 (0.181)
Exports . . 0.011 (0.008) -0.019c (0.010)
Firm Age . . 0.142 (0.099) -0.046 (0.033)
Mkt. Cap . . 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.003)
Exchange Rates . . -0.032b (0.015) 0.008 (0.007)
Tax Rates . . -1.117 (1.060) 2.104 (1.873)
Prev. WOS Sample . . -0.643b (0.314) -0.318b (0.145)
Prev. WOS Host . . -0.589b (0.287) -0.299b (0.141)
Keiretsu . . -0.109 (0.478) 0.346 (0.442)
Obs 759 759
LR test 123.27 129.47
Prob ¿ χ2 0.032 0.021
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Time, country, and industry dummy
variables included.a,b,c-signiﬁcant at the 1%,5% and 10%-levels, respectively.
39